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REIMAGINING CONTENT MODERATION: 
SECTION 230 AND THE PATH TO INDUSTRY-
GOVERNMENT COOPERATION 
Yeva Mikaelyan* 
In February 2020, the Ninth Circuit held that YouTube, as a private 
entity, does not have to provide First Amendment protections to its content 
creators.  The holding was not surprising or groundbreaking, but the case 
served as catalyst in the discussion of how platforms should moderate con-
tent.  This was further amplified when over the summer, Twitter started to 
add warnings under some of President Donald Trump’s tweets. In response, 
the President called to “REVOKE 230.” 
“230” refers to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. At a 
high level, Section 230 allows platforms to moderate content at their discre-
tion without fear of liability.  But today, platforms dominate much of the 
national discourse and heavily influence politics and government.  This Note 
explores the role of Section 230 in today’s social media-dominated world 
and critiques the recent push to regulate Section 230.  This Note argues that 
the First Amendment and government intervention are ineffective and dan-
gerous tools in Section 230 regulation.  Instead, this Note proposes a collab-
orative industry-government approach that balances on the needs of social 
media platforms, government, users, and content creators. 
 
                                                          
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, LMU Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  The author would like to thank 
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to thank Jameson Evans, Natalie Kalbakian, Fernanda Sanchez Jara, and the entire staff of Loyola 
of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their hard work, feedback, and support on this Note.  
Finally, the author would like to thank Alena McLucas for taking one of our midnight conversations 
down the rabbit hole that spawned the idea for this Note. 
 
MIKAELYAN_MACROS_V4.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2021  11:28 PM 
180 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Early on the morning of May 29, 2020, the President of the United 
States, Donald Trump, posted a tweet.1  It read: “REVOKE 230!”2 
Though it was only two words, the Tweet spoke to an issue brewing for 
years in the internet space—whether the government should regulate content 
on social media platforms or whether platforms should continue to regulate 
themselves. 
A few days before posting the tweet, President Trump tweeted that al-
lowing mail-in voting would lead to mass voter fraud and lead to a “Rigged 
Election.”3  Twitter responded by adding a warning below his tweet and flag-
ging it as false and misleading.4  Throughout the next few months, Twitter 
continued to add warning labels under President Trump’s tweets5 and com-
mitted to flagging other false and misleading information on the platform.6 
The ability of Twitter to flag and add warnings to his tweets was the 
exact reason that President Trump had called to revoke “230.”  “230” refers 
to section 230 (“Section 230”) of the Communications Decency Act 
                                                          
1. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 29, 2020, 8:15 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1266387743996870656 [https://archive.is/iBmsK].  
2. Id.  
3. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2020, 5:17 AM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1265255835124539392 [https://archive.is/XJ8eS].  
4. Trump Makes Unsubstantiated Claim That Mail-In Ballots Will Lead to Voter Fraud, 
TWITTER (May 26, 2020), https://twitter.com/i/events/1265330601034256384 [https://archive.is
/YMrHI].  
5. During the national protests in the aftermath of George Floyd’s killing, President Trump 
tweeted that the military would intervene if the protests involved looting, tweeting “when the loot-
ing starts, the shooting starts.”  Twitter added a content warning to the tweet, asserting that the 
tweet was “glorifying violence” but that it would not be taken down because “it may be in the 
public’s best interest for the Tweet to remain accessible.”  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), 
TWITTER (May 28, 2020, 9:53 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status
/1266231100780744704 [https://archive.is/Ghu6u].  
6. Lauren Feiner, Twitter CEO Stands by Fact-Check on Trump’s Tweets as the White 
House Prepares an Executive Order on Social Media Bias, CNBC (May 28, 2020, 10:22 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/28/twitter-ceo-stands-by-fact-check-on-trumps-tweets.html 
[https://perma.cc/3J48-BBUM].  
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(“CDA”),7 a law that was passed in 1996 because of growing concern that 
minors could easily access pornography on the internet.8  Though the Su-
preme Court of the United States deemed many parts of the CDA unconsti-
tutional, Section 230 remains in effect.9  At a high level, Section 230 pro-
vides platforms with broad authority to remove user-generated content as 
they see fit and shields them from civil liability for most content moderation 
decisions.10 
The ability of platforms to censor content at their discretion often 
causes tension11 between regulators, platforms, content creators, and users.12  
In February 2020, these tensions flared when content creator Prager Univer-
sity opposed a content moderation decision by Google’s video hosting plat-
form, YouTube.13  Prager University is not a traditional university.14  It is “a 
                                                          
7. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018).  
8. William A. Sodeman, Communications Decency Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 
(Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Communications-Decency-Act [https://
perma.cc/8BPL-YH3Y].  
9. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (holding that the portions of the CDA banning 
“indecency” and “offensive” material are unconstitutional); CDA 230: The Most Important Law 
Protecting Internet Speech, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230/legisla-
tive-history [https://perma.cc/5EM2-WVWW].  
10. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); Section 230’s protections and limitations are described in greater 
detail in Part III.  
11. E.g., Michelle Castillo, Why Some YouTube Stars Are Angry at the Platform, CNBC 
(Sept. 7, 2016, 3:13 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/07/why-some-youtube-stars-are-angry-
at-the-platform.html [https://perma.cc/UE7Y-PFG8] (discussing that YouTube creators are angry 
at the platform for censoring sensitive content); Kevin Roose, The President Versus the Mods, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/technology/trump-twitter.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q3W4-DH6X] (discussing Twitter users who are angry about Twitter’s warnings 
on some of President Trump’s tweets).  
12. This article frequently uses the terms “content creator” and “user.”  For the purposes of 
this article, a content creator is a person or group that creates and posts user-generated content, such 
as someone who posts a YouTube video or a tweet.  A user is a person who consumes content, but 
does not necessarily create content, such as a person with a YouTube account that does not post 
videos.  Content creators are often also users and vice versa.  While most content creators post 
content casually, some people or groups are content creators for a living and thus have an additional 
financial stake in platform content moderation decisions.  
13. See generally Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020).  
14. Id. at 995.  
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nonprofit educational and media organization with a mission to ‘provide 
conservative viewpoints and perspective on public issues that it believes are 
often overlooked.’”15  Prager University’s YouTube channel features videos 
speaking out against the Black Lives Matter movement,16 condemning the 
anti-fascist political group Antifa,17 and promoting content from conserva-
tive commentators like Ben Shapiro18 and Candace Owens.19 
Prager University sued YouTube because YouTube placed some of 
Prager University’s videos on Restricted Mode, which is a platform setting 
that a user can choose to enable “that makes unavailable certain age-inap-
propriate content.”20  Only about 1.5-2% of YouTube’s users enable re-
stricted mode.21  To determine which videos are limited by Restricted Mode, 
YouTube uses algorithms to flag sensitive content such as material related 
to drug use, sex, and violence and makes the flagged content unavailable to 
those that enable Restricted Mode.22  On Prager University’s channel specif-
ically, YouTube restricted videos pertaining to subjects such as abortion and 
“radical” Islam.23   
YouTube also disabled monetization—or “demonetized”—several of 
Prager University’s videos, which is a process that removes advertisements 
                                                          
15. Id.  
16. PragerU, ‘Black Lives Matter’ Is Not Helping Blacks, YOUTUBE (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxLi-6RtmUQ [https://perma.cc/3RZH-9DXN].  
17. PragerU, Antifa Declared A Terrorist Group, YOUTUBE (June 4, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dba5MOnxFxo [https://perma.cc/BB5X-8JBG].  
18. PragerU, New Release This Monday, YOUTUBE (July 18, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=DuYvc-bPsgQ [https://perma.cc/GZ9T-X68K].  
19. PragerU, The Candace Owens Show: Dinesh D’Souza, YOUTUBE (July 26, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X5_DBg31ZWU [https://perma.cc/7QHR-LCJ8].  
20. Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 996.  
21. Id.  
22. Johanna Wright, An Update on Restricted Mode, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (Apr. 21, 
2017), https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/an-update-on-restricted-mode/ [https://perma.cc
/7A58-JK4L].  
23. Editorial: YouTube has censorship problems.  The 1st Amendment Isn’t the Tool to Fix 
Them, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-02-27
/prager-university-youtube-lawsuit-rejected-9th-circuit [http://archive.vn/90KFA]. 
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from a videos that would otherwise allow Prager University to profit finan-
cially from the video’s views.24  For a video to qualify for monetization, it 
has to follow YouTube’s Community Guidelines, Terms of Service, copy-
right policies, and advertising policies.25  YouTube’s advertising guidelines 
are particularly elusive and restrict, among other things, content that is adult, 
hateful, demeaning, shocking, controversial, or sensitive.26   
In its opinion in Prager University v. Google, the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered, among other things, whether YouTube infringed on Prager University’s 
First Amendment right to free speech by restricting and demonetizing its 
videos.27  Ultimately, the court held that because YouTube is a private com-
pany, it does not have to provide free speech protections to its content crea-
tors and may censor content on its platform at its discretion.28  The court 
compared YouTube to a larger version of a private town bulletin board or 
coffee shop where the public could share ideas.29  Although YouTube is cer-
tainly a private entity that hosts speech, the problem with this comparison is 
the extent to which YouTube offers a bigger platform.  While a local coffee 
shop or bulletin board might reach a few hundred visitors, YouTube touts 
over 30 million visitors per day.30 
The magnitude of YouTube cannot be ignored when discussing its 
place in society.  YouTube, along with other major social networks like Fa-
cebook and Twitter, are massive platforms that, together, host billions of us-
ers.31  In addition to providing entertainment, social media platforms provide 
                                                          
24. Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 996.  
25. YouTube Chanel Monetization Policies, YOUTUBE (2020), https://support.google.com
/youtube/answer/1311392?hl=en [https://perma.cc/ZH9Q-AM6P].  
26. Advertiser-Friendly Content Guidelines, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com
/youtube/answer/6162278 [https://perma.cc/AL5H-K8EK].  
27. Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 996.   
28. Id. at 996–97.  
29. Id. at 995.  
30. Id.  
31. J. Clement, Global Social Networks Ranked by Number of Users 2020, STATISTA (Aug. 
21, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-
of-users/ [https://perma.cc/R5NE-FXLV].  
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Americans with information.  In 2019, about 55% of American adults re-
ported that they get their news from social media platforms such as Facebook 
and Twitter either “often” or “sometimes”—up by 8% from the year be-
fore.32  Politicians can now directly post content for their supporters in a way 
that has never been done before; content creators can gain power by reaching 
followers around the world; and users can isolate themselves into virtual 
echo chambers by consuming only material that aligns with their views.33  
The ability of platforms to censor and promote content at their discretion 
gives them unprecedented power to influence opinions and discourse.   
Though many Americans consider the current methods of content mod-
eration problematic, 34  there is currently no consensus on a solution.  Legal 
scholars have suggested various approaches such as treating companies as 
individual “governors” of their platforms,35 comparing major platforms to 
nations with their own governments,36 and modifying First Amendment doc-
trines to encompass regulation of platforms.37 
This Note argues that the most optimal approach to content moderation 
focuses on the needs of content creators and users and involves both govern-
ment and industry stakeholders.  Part II explains content moderation and so-
cial media community standards in detail.  Part III describes Section 230 
protections and identifies two major issues with the current model of plat-
form self-regulation: the constant threat of government interference and po-
tential platform abandonment by users due to inconsistent and frustrating 
                                                          
32. Peter Suciu, More Americans Are Getting Their News from Social Media, FORBES (Oct. 
11, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2019/10/11/more-americans-are-
getting-their-news-from-social-media/#4ab1c2ad3e17 [https://perma.cc/323Z-KNGU].  
33. Sam Sanders, Did Social Media Ruin Election 2016?, NPR (Nov. 8, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/11/08/500686320/did-social-media-ruin-election-2016 [https://
perma.cc/4AES-E62E].  
34. Suciu, supra note 32 (describing a 2019 report in which “[88%] of Americans. . . rec-
ognized that social media companies now have at least some control over the mix of the news that 
people see each day [and] . . . 62% felt this was a problem”).  
35. See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018).   
36. See generally Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1815 (2012).  
37. See generally Jonathan Peters, The “Sovereigns of Cyberspace” and State Action: The 
First Amendment’s Application (or Lack Thereof) to Third-Party Platforms, 32 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 989 (2017).  
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content moderation decisions.  Part IV explores the reasons that First 
Amendment free speech protections and government regulation are ineffec-
tive models for content moderation.  Finally, this Note proposes a content 
moderation model which features cooperation between government and in-
dustry leaders and encompasses the values of transparency, accountability, 
and consistency. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CONTENT MODERATION 
Why is it that we do not encounter violent videos, graphic images, or 
pornography more frequently on major social media platforms?  The broad 
answer to this question is because platforms engage in content moderation.  
Content moderation is “the practice of flagging user-generated submissions 
based on a set of guidelines in order to determine whether the submission 
can be used or not in the related media.”38  Section A of this Part explains 
the reasons that content moderation is in the best interest of users and plat-
forms.  Section B then describes how content moderation consists of a com-
bination of human moderators, algorithms, and user reports and discusses the 
flaws inherent to each form.   
A. Why Do Platforms Moderate Content? 
Platforms have both legal and social authority to moderate user-gener-
ated content.  Section 230(c)(2) of the CDA provides platforms with the ex-
press legal authority to moderate content.39  Beyond legal authorization, so-
ciety has come to expect that platforms will moderate and filter certain 
content in order to protect users.40  Platforms moderate content “out of a 
sense of corporate responsibility” that is based in “American free speech and 
                                                          
 38. What Is Content Moderation and Why Companies Need It, BRIDGED (Sept. 3, 2019), 
https://bridged.co/blog/what-is-content-moderation-why-companies-need-it/ [https://perma.cc
/VE4J-UQWH].  
39. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)–(B) (2020) (stating that “[n]o provider or user of an interac-
tive computer service shall be held liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good 
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not 
such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described 
in paragraph (1).”).  
40. See What Is Content Moderation and Why Companies Need It, supra note 38.   
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democratic values.”41  Perhaps most importantly, a platform’s economic vi-
ability depends on content moderation, especially of violent or obscene con-
tent.42  Imagine, for example, a world in which Facebook posed a constant 
risk of exposing users to videos of beheadings or pornographic images.  Such 
a Facebook would be unusable and unacceptable to many users, likely re-
sulting in those users abandoning the platform for its lack of moderation.  
Therefore, it is in a platform’s best interest to moderate content to ensure that 
the website is friendly to as many users as possible. 
To properly moderate content, platforms today use sets of community 
guidelines to determine what sort of content is allowed on the platform.43  If 
a post violates a platform’s community guidelines, the platform can moder-
ate the content in various ways, such as issuing a warning over, removing, 
restricting, or demonetizing44 the content.45 
 
B. What Does Content Moderation Look Like? 
To conceptualize the monumental task of content moderation, it helps 
to understand that there are 317,000 Facebook statuses,46 347,000 tweets,47 
                                                          
41. Klonick, supra note 35, at 1625–26.  
42. Id. at 1625.  
43. See id. at 1631.  
44. Demonetization is the process of disabling content’s ability to generate revenue through 
advertising income.  James Johnson, How to Survive YouTube Demonetization and Continue Mak-
ing Money from Your Channel, USCREEN (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.uscreen.tv/blog/how-to-sur-
vive-youtube-demonetization/ [https://perma.cc/YX88-8NXK].  
45. See generally Jillian C. York & Corynne McSherry, Content Moderation Is Broken. Let 
Us Count the Ways., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019
/04/content-moderation-broken-let-us-count-ways [https://perma.cc/7P6E-9ARB]; Christine 
Fisher, YouTube Will Temporarily Increase Automated Content Moderation, ENGADGET (Mar. 16, 
2020), https://www.engadget.com/2020-03-16-youtube-automated-content-moderation-corona-
virus.html [https://perma.cc/2JKT-RMW9].  
46. Facebook by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics and Fun Facts, OMNICORE (Apr. 22, 
2020), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/facebook-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/EU89-A2FN].  
47. Twitter by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics and Fun Facts, OMNICORE (Feb. 10, 
2020), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/twitter-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/P3AE-SQHU].  
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and 500 hours of YouTube video footage48 posted every single minute.  So-
cial media platforms use a combination of human moderators, automated al-
gorithms, and user reports to filter through the massive amount of content 
contained on their platforms.49   
The need to moderate this material started with the rise of websites that 
featured large amounts of user-generated content, some of which could be 
inappropriate or undesirable for users to encounter.50  The very first form of 
platform content moderation was performed by human employees.51  Human 
content moderators still work in call center-like hubs around the world and 
review content reported by users.52  Although these employees have hand-
books—some up to 80 pages long53—that dictate what sort of content to re-
move, content moderation is an inevitably subjective and inconsistent art.  
Moderators can and do make exceptions for certain content based on its con-
text.54  For example, a platform could have a rule banning derogatory lan-
guage, which may include the N-word.  However, banning use of the N-word 
outright “could be completely insensitive to the African American commu-
nity in the United States,” who may use the N-word in a non-derogatory 
manner.55  Before making a content moderation decision, a content modera-
tor would have to take into account more subjective factors such as who used 
the N-word and the context in which it was used.  The process becomes 
thorny when content moderators, who often work in traumatic and mentally 
                                                          
48. YouTube by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics and Fun Facts, OMNICORE (Feb. 10, 
2020), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/youtube-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/B67L-CRUL].  
49. What Is Content Moderation and Why Companies Need It, supra note 38.   
50. Minna Ruckenstein & Linda Lisa Maria Turunen, Re-humanizing the Platform: Content 
Moderators and the Logic of Care, 22.6 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1026, https://journals.sagepub.com
/doi/full/10.1177/1461444819875990# [https://perma.cc/JPP2-MD22].  
51. York & McSherry, supra note 45.  
52. Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor: The Secret Lives of Facebook Moderators in Amer-
ica, VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cogni-
zant-facebook-content-moderator-interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona [https://ar-
chive.is/Qb9vb].  
53. Klonick, supra note 35, at 1634.  
54. Id. at 1634–35.  
55. Id. at 1634.  
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draining environments,56 are put in the position of making snap decisions 
about sensitive content.  Such decisions consistently invite individual biases 
regarding race, gender, and sexual orientation to play a role in content mod-
eration decisions.57 
Because of the large amount of content uploaded to platforms daily, 
human teams are not sufficient to moderate content on their own.  Though it 
is unclear exactly what percentage of content is moderated by algorithms as 
opposed to humans, platforms want algorithms to play an increasingly prom-
inent role in content moderation.58  An example of when an algorithm is used 
in content moderation is in the period of time between when a video is up-
loaded and when it is posted.59  During this period, algorithms scan the up-
loaded content against digital libraries and search for prohibited material 
such as graphic imagery or copyrighted matter.60  However, algorithms can-
not exercise the same level of nuanced discretion as human moderators 
which can result in “an even more secretive process in which false positives 
may never see the light of day.”61  For example, algorithms can detect nudity 
with a high rate of accuracy, but may have trouble discerning between 
                                                          
56. Human content moderators spend their shifts reviewing “hate speech, . . . violent at-
tacks, [and] graphic pornography.”  Because of the nature of the work, some employees have re-
ported developing severe mental health issues.  Newton, supra note 52.  
57. Daisy Soderberg-Rivkin, When It Comes to Content Moderation, We’ve Been Focusing 
on the Wrong Type of Bias, MORNING CONSULT (Dec. 5, 2019 5:00 AM), https://morningcon-
sult.com/opinions/when-it-comes-to-content-moderation-weve-been-focusing-on-the-wrong-type-
of-bias/ [https://perma.cc/D9J2-SLT2] (giving several examples of content moderation decisions 
motivated by bias, including Facebook’s quick removal of a post about the fragility of white men 
as hate speech and YouTube’s restricting of LGBTQ+-themed videos at a high rate).  
58. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 35, at 1636; Shannon Bond, Facebook, YouTube Warn of 
More Mistakes as Machines Replace Moderators, NPR (Mar. 31, 2020, 5:06 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2020/03/31/820174744/facebook-youtube-warn-of-more-mistakes-as-machines-re-
place-moderators [https://perma.cc/ZDF4-KQ6W] (explaining that major platforms sent many hu-
man content moderators home due to the COVID-19 pandemic and plan to rely more heavily on 
automated content moderation methods in the future).  
59. Klonick, supra note 35, at 1636.  
60. Id. at 1637.  
61. York & McSherry, supra note 45.  
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“Renaissance art . . . and banned content such as sexual activity.”62  The 
struggle of algorithms to recognize nuance has led to the removal of other-
wise appropriate content, including YouTube news coverage of extremist at-
tacks that algorithms failed to distinguish from the extremist attacks them-
selves.63 
Finally, a platform’s users also help with the content moderation pro-
cess.64  Platforms generally have reporting tools that individual users can use 
to flag content that they believe should not be on the platform.65  The flagged 
content is then reviewed by moderators who decide whether or not to remove 
the content.66  However, platform users often flag content inappropriately.67  
Most flagged content does not violate community standards but instead “of-
ten reflect[s] . . . conflicts or disagreements of opinion.”68  The reporting 
process is also administered unevenly because it can result in flagging more 
visible or disliked people at a higher rate, even if similar content posted oth-
ers with lower profiles is permitted.69 
No single method of content moderation is sufficient on its own.  Ulti-
mately, whether content moderation remains controlled by platforms, be-
comes regulated by the government, or is implemented by another method, 
the combination of human content moderators, algorithms, and user reports 
will inevitably play a role in ensuring that websites remain safe and usable 
for users. 
                                                          
62. Ben Dickson, Human Help Wanted: Why AI Is Terrible at Content Moderation, PC 
MAG. (July 10, 2019), https://www.pcmag.com/opinions/human-help-wanted-why-ai-is-terrible-
at-content-moderation [https://perma.cc/7VFF-EA8K].  
63. Id.  
64. What Is Content Moderation and Why Companies Need It, supra note 38.   
65. Id.  
66. Newton, supra note 52.  
67. See Klonick, supra note 35, at 1638. 
 68. Id. 
69. York & McSherry, supra note 45.  
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH PLATFORM SELF-REGULATION 
Section 230 largely allows platforms to moderate user-generated con-
tent at their discretion.70  However, the autonomy that platforms enjoy in this 
realm is under threat.  In 2020, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) declared 
that “the time is ripe” to amend Section 230.71  Congress heeded the call and 
proposed several bills that seek to roll back Section 230 protections.72  In 
addition to legal threats, creators and users have grown increasingly frus-
trated with community guidelines that are “opaque” and change frequently, 
creating uncertainty as to whether they are violating platform standards.73  
Section A of this Part details Section 230’s protections and limitations in the 
content moderation arena.  Section B discusses current government attempts 
to limit Section 230 protections.  Finally, Section C explains how the grow-
ing frustration from creators and users regarding platform content modera-
tion decisions could eventually lead to the decline or abandonment of plat-
forms.  The increasing attempts at government regulation, combined with 
creator and user frustration at platform decisions, makes total content mod-
eration autonomy an increasingly unlikely model for the future. 
A. How Does Section 230 Protect Platforms? 
Section 230 provides platforms with two protections that allow them to 
regulate user-generated content without the fear of civil liability.   
First, Section 230(c)(1) sets forth that “[n]o provider or user of an in-
teractive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”74  This 
                                                          
70. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018) (providing that platforms shall not be treated as publishers 
of user-generated content); 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2018) (protecting platforms from civil liability 
for steps taken to moderate most content).  
71. Section 230—Nurturing Innovation or Fostering Unaccountability?, U.S. DEPT. JUST. 
(June 2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1286331/download [https://perma.cc/T9AK-PMFX].  
72. See, e.g., S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 73. Klonick, supra note 35, at 1630.  Klonick discusses the evolution of content modera-
tion.  In the early days of social media, platforms had small, vague lists of things that were not 
allowed, and much of the moderation was based on “gut feelings.”  Over time, major platforms 
developed large, international teams that use more robust sets of guidelines to moderate content.   
74. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  
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provision applies to any “interactive computer service,”75 such as a social 
media platform76 or the comment section of a newspaper’s website.77  The 
protection under Section 230(c)(1) means that platforms are not treated as 
the publishers of user-generated content.78  Therefore, if a YouTube creator 
posts a defamatory video, YouTube will not be liable for defamation because 
the creator, not YouTube, is considered the publisher of the content.79 
Second, Section 230(c)(2) sets forth that providers of interactive com-
puter services will not face civil liability for “any action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or 
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is con-
stitutionally protected.”80  This provision provides social media platforms 
with broad authority to set and enforce their own content moderation rules.81  
Section 230(c)(1) and Section 230(c)(2) thus work together to provide plat-
forms with the freedom to set their own community guidelines, to shield 
them from civil liability for most actions taken to moderate content, and to 
shield them from liability for content posted by their users. 
                                                          
75. An interactive computer service is “any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server . . .”.  47 
U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2018).  
76. See Fed. Agency of News LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1305 (N.D. 
Cal. 2019) (asserting that Facebook clearly meets the definition of an interactive computer service); 
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that AOL is not liable for 
tortious content posted by a user because AOL is an interactive computer service and not the pub-
lisher of the material).  
77. Makena Kelly, Big Tech’s Liability Shield Under Fire Yet Again from Republicans, 
VERGE (July 28, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/28/8933871/big-techs-liabil-
ity-shield-under-fire-yet-again-from-republicans [http://archive.today/h3rge].  
78. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (explaining that “[Section 230] precludes courts from entertain-
ing claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role.”).  
79. Id.  
80. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).  
81. Russell Brandom, Senate Republicans Want to Make It Easier to Sue Tech Companies 
for Bias, VERGE (June 17, 2020, 9:46 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/17/21294032/sec-
tion-230-hawley-rubio-conservative-bias-lawsuit-good-faith [http://archive.today/QmhYc].  
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The protections under Section 230(c), however, are not absolute.  Sec-
tion 230(e) sets forth limitations to Section 230(c).82  Section 230(e) explains 
that interactive computer services could face liability under criminal law, 
intellectual property law, state law, communications privacy law, and sex 
trafficking law for their content moderation decisions.83   
The most controversial Section 230(e) exception to date is the provi-
sion against sex trafficking,84 which Congress passed as a package in 2018 
through the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act 
(“FOSTA”)85 and Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (“SESTA”).86  The 
House bill clarified that “[Section 230(c)] does not prohibit the enforcement 
against providers and users of interactive computer services of Federal and 
State criminal and civil law relating to sexual exploitation of children or sex 
trafficking . . . .”87  It also amended the federal criminal code to define illegal 
“participation in a venture” that engages in sex trafficking as “knowingly 
assisting, supporting, or facilitating [a sex trafficking violation].”88  SESTA 
largely echoed FOSTA and set forth that “[Section 230(c)(2)] shall not be 
construed to impair or limit . . . any claim in a civil action brought under 
[federal sex trafficking law] . . . or . . . any charge in a criminal prosecution 
brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge constitutes a 
                                                          
82. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).  
83. Id.  
84. “Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair 
or limit—(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct 
underlying the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title; (B) any charge in a criminal 
prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a viola-
tion of section 1591 of Title 18; or (C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State 
law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of section 2421A of Title 18, 
and promotion or facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the defendant’s pro-
motion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5).  
85. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 
115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421A and 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018)).  
86. S. 1693, 115th Cong. (2017).  
87. H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (2017).  
88. H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. § 5 (2017). 
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violation of [federal sex trafficking law].”89  Ultimately, FOSTA and SESTA 
worked together to create an exception under Section 230(e) for sex traffick-
ing,90 but did little to specify exactly what terms such as “facilitating” sex 
trafficking meant. 
FOSTA-SESTA was criticized by groups such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the Sex Workers Outreach Project 
(“SWOP”) as a “disguised internet censorship bill” intended to weaken Sec-
tion 230 protections and control the content allowed by interactive service 
providers.91  The seemingly innocuous goal of preventing sex trafficking was 
extremely consequential for platforms, users, and creators.  To avoid poten-
tial liability created by FOSTA-SESTA, many platforms created stricter 
community guidelines around any sexual or sex-adjacent content.92  The 
stricter enforcement by platforms resulted in unfortunate consequences, such 
as encouraging consensual online sex workers off of the internet and to the 
street93 and resulting in the deletion of content that was posted to help victims 
of sex trafficking.94   
                                                          
89. S. 1693, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017).  
90. See supra note 84.  
91. SWOP-USA Stands in Opposition of Disguised Internet Censorship Bill SESTA, S. 
1963, SWOP-USA (Aug. 11, 2017), https://swopusa.org/blog/2017/08/11/call-to-actionpress-re-
lease-swop-usa-stands-in-direct-opposition-of-disguised-internet-censorship-bill-sesta-s-1963-
call-your-state-representatives-and-tell-them-to-fight/ [https://perma.cc/T4TX-CRUK].  
92. Anthony Cuthbertson, Tumblr Porn Ban: One-Fifth of Users Have Deserted Site Since 
It Removed Adult Content, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 11, 2019, 4:06 PM), https://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/tumblr-porn-ban-nsfw-verizon-yahoo-adult-content-
a8817546.html [https://perma.cc/UT8W-V4YU].  
93. Mike Masnick, The Human Cost of FOSTA, TECHDIRT (May 7, 2019, 9:39 AM), https://
www.techdirt.com/articles/20190503/13180842135/human-cost-fosta.shtml [https://perma.cc
/B78E-LAUP].  
94. Id.  
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B. Government Attempts to Regulate Section 230 
Today, Section 230 protections for social media platforms face threats 
from both Congress and executive branch.95  Subsections (1) and (2) focus 
on two recent government efforts to scale back Section 230 protections for 
social media platforms.  The first is former President Trump’s executive or-
der96 directing the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to draft 
regulations that clarify, among other things, when interactive computer ser-
vices can be held liable for content moderation decisions not taken in good 
faith.97  The second is a bipartisan bill called the Eliminating Abusive and 
Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act of 2020 (“EARN IT Act”), 
which seeks to expand Section 230(e)’s to include an exception for violations 
of “child sexual exploitation law.”98 
1. President Trump’s “Executive Order on Preventing Online 
Censorship” 
President Trump’s May 26, 2020 tweet stating that the use of mail-in 
ballots for the 2020 presidential election would lead to widespread voter 
fraud99 catapulted the discussion about the future of Section 230 into public 
discourse.  In response to the tweet, Twitter added a link below the tweet 
titled: “Get the facts about mail-in ballots” and characterized President 
Trump’s claims as “unsubstantiated.”100  Upset at Twitter’s response, 
                                                          
95. Casey Newton, Everything You Need to Know About Section 230, VERGE (May 28, 
2020, 3:46 PM), https://www.theverge.com/21273768/section-230-explained-internet-speech-law-
definition-guide-free-moderation [https://archive.is/Pt3uG].  
96. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079, § 8(a)(i) (June 2, 2020).  
97. Section 230(c)(2)(A) protects platforms from civil liability for “any action voluntarily 
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers 
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” (emphasis added); 47 U.S.C. § 
230(c)(2)(A) (2018).  In his executive order, President Trump asks the FCC to clarify when content 
moderation decisions could be considered not “in good faith.”  
98. EARN IT Act of 2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020).  
99. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2020, 5:17 AM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1265255835124539392 [https://archive.is/XJ8eS].  
100. Id.; Trump Makes Unsubstantiated Claim That Mail-In Ballots Will Lead to Voter 
Fraud, supra note 4. 
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President Trump issued an executive order titled “Executive Order on Pre-
venting Online Censorship.”101   
The executive order asserts that it is “un-American” and “dangerous” 
to allow a small number of companies to “pick the speech that Americans 
may access and convey on the internet.”102  It then directs the Federal Com-
munications Commission (“FCC”) to draft regulations that: (1) “clarify and 
determine the circumstances under which a provider of an interactive com-
puter service that restricts access to content in a manner not specifically pro-
tected by [Section 230(c)(2)(A)] may also not be able to claim protection 
under [Section 230(c)(1);]” (2) specify when a company’s conduct could vi-
olate Section 230’s “good faith” provision; and (3) propose any other regu-
lation that “may be appropriate to expand [this] policy.”103  The executive 
order also calls for an investigation of whether social media companies en-
gage in discrimination based on the political viewpoint of a content crea-
tor.104   
Although the President does not have the authority to change an exist-
ing law by issuing an executive order,105 the order could prove impactful in 
one of two ways.  First, courts have determined that where a law is unclear, 
federal agencies may step in and “fill the gap.”106  A statute may provide this 
gap filling authority either explicitly through Congress or may provide im-
plicit authorization by not defining key terms.107  When the relevant federal 
                                                          
101. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34079.   
102. Id.  
103. Id. at 34081.  
104. Id. at 34081–82.  
105. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring).  
106. E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) 
(stating that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute” 
which can be either explicit or implicit); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Geodis Logistics, LLC, No. 1:19-
CV-03341-JPB, 2020 WL 4938362, at *3 (N.D. Ga. July 7, 2020) (explaining that “because the 
statute is silent as to who is liable for demurrage, the [Surface Transformation Board] had the au-
thority to ‘fill the gap’ and issue a regulation regarding the issue”).  
107. S.F. Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 481 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that 
“[b]y not defining further the meaning of ‘waters of the United States,’ Congress implicitly 
MIKAELYAN_MACROS_V4.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2021  11:28 PM 
196 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:2 
 
agency interprets a statue, “the court should defer to the agency’s interpreta-
tion as long as it is reasonable.”108  Thus with regards to Section 230, the 
FCC may be able to formulate guidelines on what sort of content moderation 
decisions do and do not constitute “good faith” pursuant to Section 
230(c)(2).109  Second, the executive order signaled the Trump administra-
tion’s approval for Congress to amend Section 230, an initiative that is seem-
ingly also supported by President Joe Biden’s administration.110  Congress 
could  heed the call given that there are already active bills intended to roll 
back Section 230 protections.  One such bill would require interactive com-
puter services to undertake a duty of good faith to keep their Section 230 
protections and would impose monetary penalties for breach.111  Another bill 
seeks to restrict an interactive computer service’s ability to moderate content 
the company finds “objectionable.”112  Even the DOJ has proposed that “the 
time is ripe” to amend Section 230 altogether.113  Thus, even though Presi-
dent Trump’s executive order does not have the force of law, the executive 
order, combined with President Biden’s stance on Section 230 nonetheless 
signals bipartisan approval of the initiatives to roll back Section 230 protec-
tions. 
                                                          
delegated policy-making authority to the EPA and the Corps, the agencies charged with the CWA’s 
administration.”).  
108. Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). 
109. See supra note 97.  Section 230(c)(2)(A) does not currently specify exactly what sort 
of conduct constitutes good faith.  
110. Joseph Fawbush, After Executive Order Condemning Online Censorship, Should So-
cial Media Companies Fear Liability?, FINDLAW (June 1, 2020, 2:30 PM), https://
blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2020/06/after-executive-order-condemning-online-censorship-
should-social-media-companies-fear-liability.html?DCMP=pro_special:nwl:z:2020june:feature 
[https://perma.cc/CEU8-HM3E].  President Biden has stated that he thinks Section 230 should be 
revoked and his current nominee for Secretary of Commerce, Gina Raimondo, believes that Section 
230 should be reformed.  Of note, the Biden administration, has not taken action in that direction 
as of the publication of this Note.  Makena Kelly, Biden’s Commerce Nominee Backs Changes to 
Section 230, VERGE (Jan. 26, 2021, 1:40 PM), https://www.thev-
erge.com/2021/1/26/22250746/biden-gina-raimondo-commerce-secretary-section-230 [https://ar-
chive.is/tCKsd].   
111. S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020); Brandom, supra note 81.  
112. H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019); Kelly, supra note 77.  
113. Section 230—Nurturing Innovation or Fostering Unaccountability, supra note 71.  
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2. EARN IT Act 
The EARN IT Act is perhaps the biggest threat to Section 230 protec-
tions today.  The bipartisan bill introduced by Senators Lindsey Graham and 
Richard Blumenthal seeks to expand Section 230(e) by amending it to in-
clude an exception for violations of federal and state “child sexual exploita-
tion law.”114  In the same way that FOSTA-SESTA added a sex trafficking 
exception to Section 230(e), the EARN IT Act seeks to add an exception for 
child sexual exploitation law.  Ultimately, the EARN It Act would set forth 
that interactive service providers could be held liable for civil and criminal 
prosecution for the “advertisement, promotion, presentation, distribution, or 
solicitation of child sexual abuse material.”115 
The EARN IT Act would also create a National Commission on Online 
Child Sexual Exploitation Prevention (“Commission”) to construct a set of 
“recommended best practices that providers of interactive computer services 
may choose to implement to prevent, reduce, and respond to the online sex-
ual exploitation of children, including the enticement, grooming, sex traf-
ficking, and sexual abuse of children and the proliferation of online child 
sexual abuse material.”116  The Commission would consist of sixteen mem-
bers117 comprised of law enforcement, online child crime experts or survi-
vors, and technology experts.118  The original version of the bill created a 
safe harbor from liability for interactive computer services that followed the 
                                                          
114. “Section 230(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(e) is amended by 
adding at the end the following: ‘(6) NO EFFECT ON CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
LAW.—Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or 
limit— ‘(A) any claim in a civil action brought against a provider of an interactive computer service 
under section 2255 of title 18, United States Code, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes 
a violation of section 2252 or section 2252A of that title; ’(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution 
brought against a provider of an interactive computer service under State law regarding the adver-
tisement, promotion, presentation, distribution, or solicitation of child sexual abuse material, as 
defined in section 2256(8) of title 18, United States Code; or ’(C) any claim in a civil action brought 
against a provider of an interactive computer service under State law regarding the advertisement, 
promotion, presentation, distribution, or solicitation of child sexual abuse material, as defined in 
section 2256(8) of title 18, United States Code.”  EARN IT Act of 2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong. 
(2020).  
115. Id. § 5(B). 
 116. Id. § 3. 
117. Id. § 3(c)(1)(A).  
118. Id. § 3(c)(2).  
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Commission’s recommendations.119  The safe harbor provision created un-
due pressure for interactive computer services to follow their recommenda-
tions in order to avoid liability.120  Although the bill has been amended to 
remove the safe harbor provision, many still worry that platforms will inev-
itably face pressure to follow the Commission’s recommendations or risk 
liability for child sexual exploitation.121 
Critics of the bill are concerned that if the EARN IT Act passes, plat-
forms will have to take restrictive content moderation steps to comply with 
potentially conflicting and expansive child exploitation laws in all fifty 
states, as they did with FOSTA-SESTA.122  The passage of the EARN IT 
Act will similarly result in stricter rules that will “force platforms to over-
censor speech out of an abundance of caution due to fear of endless litiga-
tion.”123 
The DOJ and Congress are eager to play a bigger role in content mod-
eration.124  Instead of amending Section 230(c) in its entirety, Congress has 
proposed bills to slowly chip away at its protections.125  Like FOSTA-
SESTA before it, the EARN IT Act seeks to add yet another exception to 
Section 230(e), giving Congress more power over platform content modera-
tion.  The EARN IT Act is thus an attempt by Congress to heed the DOJ’s 
call that “the time is ripe” to roll back Section 230 protections.126 
                                                          
119. Id. § 6(a)(6)(B).  
120. Michael S. Horikawa & Jon Schreiber, EARN IT Act Amendments Could Shift Section 
230 Protection from DOJ Guideline Compliance to Post Hoc Enforcement Regime, JD SUPRA: 
PILLSBURY (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/earn-it-act-amendments-could-
shift-48919/ [https://perma.cc/NKD5-3Z4D].  
121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
123. Corey Silverstein, The EARN IT Act: Are You Paying Attention Yet?, XBIZ (Aug. 23, 
2020), https://www.xbiz.com/features/253832/the-earn-it-act-are-you-paying-attention-yet 
[https://perma.cc/VD39-CJQD]; Horikawa & Schreiber, supra note 120.  
124. Department of Justice’s Review of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 
1996, supra note 64.  
125. E.g., EARN IT Act of 2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. 
(2019).  
126. Section 230—Nurturing Innovation or Fostering Unaccountability, supra note 71. 
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C. Creator and User Frustration with Content Regulation Methods 
The possibility of government intervention in content moderation is not 
the only threat to platforms.  Another is the threat of usage decline by in-
creasingly confused, frustrated, and distrustful creators and users.127  Sub-
sections (1) and (2) below focus on two areas of platform abandonment: (1) 
a brief overview of the reasons behind previous platform abandonment and 
(2) what platform abandonment could mean for major social media platforms 
today. 
1. A History of Platform Abandonment 
It is difficult to imagine a world where Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube do not play a role in everyday life.  In 2010, it must have been 
equally difficult to imagine a world without renting a weekend movie from 
Blockbuster.  Ten years prior, it would be similarly difficult to imagine a 
world without malls for back-to-school shopping.  And yet, both Block-
buster128 and malls,129 once staples of daily life, today seem like relics of a 
different era.  The idea that today’s social media platforms will last forever 
is therefore misguided, despite their explosive growth in the 21st century.130 
The first notable instance of a fallen powerhouse in the social media 
realm was the fall of MySpace in the late 2000s.  MySpace, which at one 
point touted more daily visitors than Google,131 declined sharply in the late 
                                                          
 127. Audrey Schomer, The Content Moderation Report: Social platforms Are Facing A 
Massive Content Crisis—Here’s Why We’re Thinking Regulation is Coming and What it Will Look 
Like, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2019, 7:03 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/content-modera-
tion-report-2019-11 [https://perma.cc/Q3RU-SM7S]. 
128. Greg Satell, A Look Back At Why Blockbuster Really Failed and Why It Didn’t Have 
To, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2014, 11:38 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2014/09/05/a-
look-back-at-why-blockbuster-really-failed-and-why-it-didnt-have-to/#27fc20961d64 [https://
perma.cc/E745-E9AJ].  
129. Mary Hanbury, 50 Haunting Photos of Abandoned Shopping Malls Across America, 
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 8, 2019, 3:49 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/american-retail-apoca-
lypse-in-photos-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/BU5E-J7KQ].  
130. Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise of Social Media, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Sept. 18, 
2019), https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media [https://perma.cc/T3UE-J7VP].  
131. Id.  
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2000s.132  The once simple platform became clunky, ad-littered, and difficult 
to use.133  The fall of MySpace demonstrated that a burdensome user expe-
rience can be fatal even to the largest and most popular platform.134 
Content moderation decisions are also decisions in user experience.135  
This was apparent with the fall of the social networking and blogging plat-
form Tumblr.  In an attempt to comply with FOSTA-SESTA in 2018, Tum-
blr created an algorithm to find and delete adult content.136  The algorithm 
targeted not only illegal content, but legal content that fell under “photos, 
videos, or GIFs that show real-life human genitals or female-presenting nip-
ples, and any content . . . that depict sex acts.”137  Before implementation of 
the algorithm, Tumblr featured a large base of consensual sex workers, blogs 
that posted sexual imagery, and blogs that discussed sexual health and 
safety.138  Once the stricter guidelines were implemented and blogs featuring 
sexual content were removed, Tumblr lost a fifth of its users.139   
                                                          
132. Matthew Garrahan, The Rise and Fall of MySpace, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2009), https://
www.ft.com/content/fd9ffd9c-dee5-11de-adff-00144feab49a [http://archive.today/tooaF]. 
 133. Id.  
134. Id.  
135. See generally Content Moderation and the User Experience, HAA SITES AT THE 
UNIV. OF PITT. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://sites.haa.pitt.edu/digitalcriticalmethods/2020/03/31/con-
tent-moderation-and-the-user-experience/ [https://perma.cc/7H7T-WVC6].  
136. What Tumblr’s Ban on ‘Adult Content’ Actually Did, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/tossedout/tumblr-ban-adult-content [https://perma.cc/VHS2-RUG5].  
137. Cuthbertson, supra note 92.  
138. Id.  
139. Id. 
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2. Potential Platform Abandonment Today 
Today, as Facebook140 and Twitter141 lose users for the first time and 
YouTube142 creators report less income from ads, decisions on how to mod-
erate content could be highly impactful for the major social media platforms.  
On YouTube, creators frequently criticize the platform’s constantly chang-
ing and confusing content-moderation standards.  The standards force crea-
tors to guess whether their content will remain on the website, lose moneti-
zation, or remain untouched. 143 
Conservative-leaning content creators like Prager University are not 
the only ones claiming that the platform is biased against their content.144  
LGBTQ+ content creators also claim that their videos are demonetized or 
restricted just for having LGBTQ+-related words in the titles.145  Even crea-
tors that make videos about sensitive topics are targeted.  For example, 
YouTube creator Phillip DeFranco posted a video covering the police killing 
of George Floyd separately from his usual daily upload for fear that the sen-
sitive content would subject the entire video to demonetization or 
                                                          
 140. Abrar Al-Heeti, Facebook Lost 15 Million US Users in the Past Two Years, Report 
Says, CNET (Mar. 6, 2019, 1:58 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-lost-15-million-us-
users-in-the-past-two-years-report-says/ [https://perma.cc/L8X7-4JSU].  
141. Kalev Leetaru, A Fading Twitter Changes Its User Metrics Once Again, FORBES (Apr. 
23, 2019, 10:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2019/04/23/a-fading-twitter-
changes-its-user-metrics-once-again/#42c25b0c7a31 [https://perma.cc/FX6Q-TWVQ].  
142. Geoff Weiss, A Lot of YouTube Creators Just Disclosed Their Declining AdSense 
Rates Amid the Coronavirus Pandemic, TUBEFILTER (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.tubefilter.com
/2020/04/16/creators-disclose-declining-adsense-rates-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/PWP2-
UARV].  
143. Louise Matsakis, YouTube Doesn’t Know Where Its Own Line Is, WIRED (Mar. 2, 
2018, 11:41 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/youtube-content-moderation-inconsistent/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YDT-5Z3R].  
144. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2020).  
145. Aja Romano, A Group of YouTubers is Trying to Prove the Site Systematically De-
monetizes Queer Content, VOX (Oct. 10, 2019, 9:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/10
/10/20893258/youtube-lgbtq-censorship-demonetization-nerd-city-algorithm-report [https://ar-
chive.is/qXiQl] (describing a study of LGBTQ+-related video titles that were deemed “fit for mon-
etization” found that 33 out of the 100 videos tested were demonetized). 
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restriction.146  The separate video discussing George Floyd was demone-
tized.147  Similarly, creator Jessica Kent, who makes educational videos 
about her former incarceration and drug addiction, has started to bleep out 
words related to drug use in her videos, despite the fact that her content is 
educational and meant to deter viewers from drug use and illegal activity.148  
Though these may seem like small annoyances, a consistent stream of small 
annoyances could deter content creators from discussing and addressing sen-
sitive topics on their channels.  Further, YouTube’s inconsistent and vague 
monetization and restriction requirements make it so that content creators 
often make guesses at what it would take to continue to make a living off of 
their content.  Even with the measures taken to prevent demonetization, cre-
ators still remain unclear as to whether the methods will work.  This sort of 
confusion is slowly driving some content creators away from YouTube.149  
As with MySpace and Tumblr, if content creators leave YouTube, they are 
likely to take their fans to new platforms along with them. 
Similarly, Twitter’s content moderation decisions have also pushed 
some creators and users to other platforms.  For example, after Twitter placed 
the content warning on President Trump’s tweet about mail-in ballots, many 
of his ardent supporters abandoned Twitter for Parler, a Twitter-like platform 
which claims to engage in minimal content regulation only driven by “the 
spirit of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”150  Parler, 
which has quickly grown to almost twelve million users,151 rapidly turned 
                                                          
146. Phillip DeFranco, Disgusting! We Need To Talk About What Happened To George 
Floyd . . . What We Know & What Happens Next, YOUTUBE (May 27, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGecrIMn_Ds [https://perma.cc/PH5Q-6HXZ].  
147. Id.  
148. Jessica Kent, Top Ten Things I Used to Do, YOUTUBE (July 27, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Uk-siZL6o [https://perma.cc/TMG2-J3EK] (explaining, in a video 
about the negative behaviors she exhibited during her drug addiction, that she must bleep out names 
of certain drugs because “YouTube is kicking [her] ass” by demonetizing videos that discuss drug 
use).  
149. Julia Alexander, YouTubers Look to New Platforms After Viewer Suppression, De-
monetization Issues, POLYGON (Apr. 17, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.polygon.com/2018/4/17
/17246948/defranco-patreon-casey-neistat-youtube-ceo-demonetized [https://archive.is/kw5vs].  
 150. Parler Community Guidelines, PARLER (Aug. 21, 2020), https://legal.parler.com/doc-
uments/guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3T3-SDYX].  
151. In early 2021, after the pro-Trump riot at the United States Capitol, President Trump 
was banned from Twitter and Parler’s user base grew from about three million to twelve million.  
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into a conservative echo chamber.  Upon joining the platform, users are im-
mediately prompted to follow Breitbart, the Daily Caller, and Eric Trump—
all avid supporters of Parler.152  Although Parler’s user base of 12 million 
pales in comparison to Twitter’s 159 million active users,153 it would be a 
mistake for today’s social media giants to ignore the threat of emerging plat-
forms to their success.  Large platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and 
YouTube should be alarmed by statistics showing that 80% of Americans 
distrust their content moderation methodologies154 because that distrust 
chips away at their content moderation autonomy and fuels additional mini-
mization of Section 230 protections.   
IV. WHAT IS THE SOLUTION? 
If full platform self-governance is unlikely to remain, what is the alter-
native?  Part IV analyzes several alternative methods to regulate content 
moderation.  Section A explains why the First Amendment’s free speech 
protections could not prevent platforms from censoring speech.  Section B 
describes how low technological literacy and political self-interest are likely 
to result in draconian content moderation decisions if the task is entirely left 
to the government.  Finally, Section C poses a solution based on government-
industry cooperation with a focus on transparency, consistency, and account-
ability. 
 
                                                          
After being taken offline by Amazon’s cloud provider, Parler sued Amazon, but the court denied 
Parler’s request to force Amazon to allow it back online.  As of the publication of this Note, Parler 
is back online using an independent server.  Rachel Lerman & Natasha Tiku, Parler is Offline, but 
Violent Posts Scraped by Hackers Will Haunt Users, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2021, 12:04 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/12/parler-data-downloaded/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q5X9-LV6F].  Igor Bonifacic, Parler Is Back Online After Amazon Kicked It Off 
the Internet, YAHOO FINANCE (Feb. 15, 2021), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/parler-back-
online-173810043.html [https://perma.cc/29HT-JXDJ].    
 152. Mark Sullivan, I Joined Parler, The Right-Wing Echo Chamber’s New Favorite Alt-
Twitter, FAST COMPANY (June 27, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90522049/i-joined-
parler-the-right-wing-echo-chambers-new-favorite-alt-twitter [https://perma.cc/6XFB-UYMZ].  
153. Twitter by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics and Fun Facts, supra note 47.  
154. Sarah Brennan, 80% of Americans Distrust Tech Companies’ Content Moderation, IT 
PRO (June 17, 2020), https://www.itpro.com/marketing-comms/social-media/356109/80-of-ameri-
cans-trust-tech-companies-content-moderation [https://perma.cc/79XU-LN2G]. 
MIKAELYAN_MACROS_V4.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2021  11:28 PM 
204 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:2 
 
A. The First Amendment Does Not Protect the Public’s Ability to 
Say Anything Online 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States says that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”155  The 
First Amendment, especially the right to free speech, is perhaps the most 
cherished right in the United States.156  For Americans, free speech is more 
than a right—it is a value,157 a “central tenet of our American way of life,”158 
and something that feels almost dystopian when denied.  Because of this, 
Americans often have visceral reactions when they are not able to say the 
things they want to say, evoking their right to free speech “every time [some-
one is] banned from Twitter.”159  Americans  value the right to free speech 
so much that they often expect it in all situations, forgetting that the Consti-
tutional right to free speech actually has several limitations.160  Most people 
know the popular analogy that “free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theatre.”161  But there are other narrow categories 
of speech that the First Amendment does not protect, including speech that 
incites lawless action, fighting words, true threats, and libel.162  The limita-
tion that is often forgotten, however, is that the Constitutional right to free 
speech—subject to all limitations, of course—is only guaranteed from the 
                                                          
155. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
156. Alex Cook, Americans Say Freedom of Speech is the Most Important Constitutional 




157. Logan Chipkin, Free Speech is a Value, Not a Right, QUILLETTE (July 6, 2020), 
https://quillette.com/2020/07/06/free-speech-is-a-value-not-a-right/ [https://perma.cc/8G7W-
PXMY].  
158. AJ Willingham, The First Amendment Doesn’t Guarantee You the Rights You Think 
It Does, CNN (Sept. 6, 2018, 7:36 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/27/politics/first-amend-
ment-explainer-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/QL8Y-VNPC].  
159. Id.  
160. Id.  
161. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
162. DAVID HUDSON, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:1 (2012).  
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government.163  Private entities are not obligated to guarantee or allow free 
speech in most situations.164   
There are some narrow exceptions for when private entities may have 
to provide certain rights that normally only the government is obligated to 
provide.165  Courts determine when this exception applies by using the judge-
made state action doctrine.166  The state action doctrine creates certain obli-
gations for a private entity when it exercises “powers traditionally exclu-
sively reserved to the State.”167  The appellant in Marsh v. Alabama,168 Grace 
Marsh, was arrested by authorities in a town that was owned and operated 
by a private company for distributing religious literature in the town.169  The 
Supreme Court of the United States found that because the town operated 
just like a regular town, it was obligated to provide to the public the same 
rights that a government-operated town would have to provide.170  Thus, the 
First Amendment allowed Marsh to distribute religious literature even in a 
company town.171   
The state action doctrine, however, has its limits.  Recently in Manhat-
tan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, the Supreme Court refused to ex-
tend the state action doctrine to a private nonprofit corporation that ran a 
city’s public access channel.172  A public access channel is a publicly-owned 
television channel that is for public use but is generally administered by a 
                                                          
163. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).  
164. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 1033 (1976).  
165. See Manhattan Cmty. Access, 139 S. Ct. at 1926.  
166. Id.  
167. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).  
168. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).  
169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 508.  
171. See id. at 508–09. 
 172. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).  
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private network.173  The Court held that the private network “merely hosting 
speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function.”174  There-
fore, the corporation that owned the public access channel was permitted to 
exercise editorial discretion and censor content that was critical of it.175 
Because of the narrow scope of the state action doctrine, by the time 
the Ninth Circuit had to decide Prager University,176 the decision was 
clear—YouTube, by hosting videos, did not perform a function that was tra-
ditionally reserved for government entities.177  Prager University attempted 
to argue that YouTube became a state actor when it hosted public speech.178  
However, the Ninth Circuit easily analogized the argument to the one that 
failed in Halleck, and held that the state action doctrine did not mandate 
YouTube to provide First Amendment protections to its users.179  It was not 
enough that hosting videos on a platform is a function that the government 
has performed at some point.180  For YouTube to become a state actor, video 
hosting would have to be a function traditionally exclusive to the govern-
ment.181  Simply hosting public speech did not “transform” YouTube into a 
public forum.182  Like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter are private entities 
that host public speech.  Therefore, courts are not likely to require them to 
provide First Amendment protections either. 
                                                          
173. Public, Educational, and Governmental Access Channels (“PEG Channels”), FCC 
(Dec. 9, 2015) https://www.fcc.gov/media/public-educational-and-governmental-access-channels-
peg-channels [https://perma.cc/CM9Q-8Y55].  
174. Manhattan Cmty. Access, 139 S. Ct. at 1930.  
175. Id. at 1930–31.  
176. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 997 n.3 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing to six dif-
ferent cases in other Circuits that refused to find that social media platforms, including Facebook 
and YouTube, were public forums or state across).  
177. Id. at 998.  
178. Id. at 997–98.  
179. Id. at 998–99.  
180. Id. at 997. 
 181. Id.  
182. Id.  
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The right to free speech is a valuable right at the cornerstone of Amer-
ican culture.  However, arguing that the First Amendment protects the ability 
to say absolutely anything online is an easy argument for courts to strike 
down.  Precedent establishes that social media companies do not provide a 
government service.183  Thus, the right to free speech outlined in the First 
Amendment is not the correct tool to use to solve the visceral reaction Amer-
icans have toward internet censorship. 
B. Government Regulation of Content Moderation is Ineffective at 
Best and Harmful at Worst 
In 2018, Google’s Chief Executive Officer, Sudar Pichai, testified in 
front of Congress for three and a half hours.184  The hearing was meant to 
address Google’s alleged anti-conservative bias.185  Some of the many 
strange questions Pichai had to answer were questions about why a photo-
graph of President Trump appears as a top result in a Google image search 
for the word “idiot” and whether Google “knew” if someone moved from 
one end of a room to the other.186  Facebook Chief Executive Officer Mark 
Zuckerberg also answered similar questions in a congressional hearing ear-
lier that year.187  Media coverage of the hearings mostly consisted of jokes 
about the low technical literacy of members of Congress and upheld a gen-
eral consensus that the government is not well-equipped to regulate large 
technology companies.188 
                                                          
183. See id.  
184. Minda Zetlin, Google CEO Sundar Pichai Spent 3 1/2 Hours Before Congress. Here 
are the Strangest Things They Asked, INC. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin
/google-ceo-sundar-pichai-congress-representatives-hearings-funny-stupid-questions.html [http://
archive.today/krcor].  
185. Id.  
186. Id.  
187. Emily Stewart, Lawmakers Seem Confused About What Facebook Does – And How 
to Fix It, VOX (Apr. 10, 2018, 7:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/10
/17222062/mark-zuckerbewestrg-testimony-graham-facebook-regulations [http://archive.today
/cRWtw].  
188. E.g., Margaret Sullivan, Members of Congress Can’t Possibly Regulate Facebook. 
They Don’t Understand It, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018, 3:42 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/lifestyle/style/members-of-congress-cant-possibly-regulate-facebook-they-dont-un-
derstand-it/2018/04/10/27fa163e-3cd1-11e8-8d53-eba0ed2371cc_story.html [https://perma.cc
/F9NT-D4WX]; Cecelia Kang et al., Knowledge Gap Hinders Ability of Congress to Regulate 
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Of course, the argument that the government cannot regulate an indus-
try simply because it is large and complex is not only inaccurate, but danger-
ous.  Many large and complex industries are regulated, such as the food in-
dustry, the pharmaceutical industry, and the financial industry.  To uphold a 
standard that complex industries are beyond regulation could create an envi-
ronment where technology companies engage in bad faith practices and take 
advantage of their users with impunity. 
Nevertheless, the hearings demonstrate that technological literacy for 
the top lawmakers in the country is low.  Given that in less than two decades, 
platforms went from inception to use by 72% of all Americans, it would be 
a mistake to undertake regulation of social media platforms without under-
standing their nuances.189  In addition, regulators, platforms, content crea-
tors, and users all have an interest in what content moderation looks like.  
Regulators and politicians have an especially strong interest, given that 
Americans increasingly use social media to connect with political figures.190   
A combination of low technical literacy and a strong personal stake in 
content moderation is a recipe for oppressive legislation that stifles speech.  
Congressional attempts to regulate Section 230 thus far do little to instill 
faith in the government’s ability to regulate platforms without such negative 
consequences.  For example, FOSTA-SESTA failed to protect victims of sex 
trafficking or reduce the incidence of sex work as intended.191  Instead, it led 
to platforms creating stricter community guidelines and taking down content 
meant to help victims of sex trafficking, thus making it more difficult for sex 
                                                          
Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/business/con-
gress-facebook-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/Z3L4-WV9T].  
189. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewre-
search.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/94AM-9V3A].  
190. Monica Anderson, More Americans Are Using Social Media to Connect With Politi-
cians, PEW RES. CTR. (May 19, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/19/more-
americans-are-using-social-media-to-connect-with-politicians/ [https://perma.cc/9RVN-BXQ2].  
191. Karol Markowicz, Congress’ awful anti-sex-trafficking law has only put sex workers 
in danger and wasted taxpayer money, BUS. INSIDER (July 14, 2019, 12:38 PM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/fosta-sesta-anti-sex-trafficking-law-has-been-failure-opinion-2019-7 [https://
perma.cc/RBU4-SRYV]; Karen Gullo & David Greene, With FOSTA Already Leading to Censor-
ship, Plaintiffs Are Seeking Reinstatement of Their Lawsuit Challenging the Law’s Constitutional-
ity, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/02/fosta-already-
leading-censorship-we-are-seeking-reinstatement-our-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/68BR-EYKS].  
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workers to “share information or warn each other away from violent cli-
ents.”192   
Like FOSTA-SESTA, the EARN IT Act raises content moderation 
freedom concerns under the guise of preventing child sexual exploitation.193  
The First Amendment provides interactive computer services with editorial 
authority over the content posted on their platforms.194  The EARN IT Act 
threatens editorial authority by pressuring platforms to create content mod-
eration standards based on suggestions by the EARN IT Act’s Commission 
that go beyond simply requiring platforms to ban unlawful content.195   
The EARN IT Act’s potential problems with vagueness and over-
breadth also pose dangers to the First Amendment rights of interactive com-
puter services.196  Vagueness in law refers to specificity—“[a] statute regu-
lating behavior must be specific enough to allow ordinary people to 
understand what conduct is prohibited and to prevent arbitrary or discrimi-
natory enforcement.”197  Overbreadth, on the other hand, refers to law that is 
overly broad in scope.198  The EARN IT Act imposes “vague and expansive 
                                                          
192. Markowicz, supra at 191; Gullo & Greene, supra note 191.   
 193. Letter from Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey, Staff Attorneys, Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation to Senate Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.eff.org/document/eff-earn-it-act-
first-amendment-letter-sjc [https://perma.cc/9393-GL6D].  
 194. Id.; Miami Herald Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).  
195. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-profit organization that works to protect 
online free speech and privacy, wrote a letter to Congress detailing its concerns that the law is not 
narrowly tailored enough to pass constitutional scrutiny.  The letter identified as concerns “[t]he 
‘best practices,’ [that] will govern how online service providers must prevent, identify, disrupt, and 
report child sexual exploitation; how they must work with ‘non-profit organizations and other pro-
viders of interactive computer services to preserve, remove from view, and report child sexual ex-
ploitation;’ how they must implement ‘a standard rating and categorization system to identify the 
type and severity of child sexual abuse material;’ and how they must employ ‘age rating and age 
gating systems to reduce child sexual exploitation.’”  Letter from Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey 
to Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 193.  
196. Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 
781 (2013) (explaining that vagueness and overbreadth in statutes pose concerns to First Amend-
ment protections).  
197. Id. at 810.  
198. Id. at 817.  
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liability for user-generated content.”199  The original version of the EARN 
IT Act required platforms to “earn” their Section 230 protections by taking 
steps to prevent child sexual exploitation based on a set of undefined “best 
practices” and creating a safe harbor for interactive computer services that 
followed the Commission’s “best practices.”200  The latest version of the 
EARN IT Act removes the safe harbor and does not specify whether plat-
forms will have to “earn” their Section 230 protection.201  It does, however, 
create liability for interactive computer services pursuant to child sexual ex-
ploitation laws from all 50 states, creating “potential offenses that will en-
compass a wide variety of state laws that apply different legal standards to 
the same conduct.”202  This sort of broad liability will likely result in the 
same type of blanket censorship caused by FOSTA-SESTA and may “con-
dition the granting of a governmental privilege [of editorial authority] on 
individuals or entities doing things that amount to a violation of their First 
Amendment rights.”203 
Thus, full government control of platform content moderation could be 
hindered by lack of understanding or vague and overly broad requirements.  
As FOSTA-SESTA and the EARN IT Act demonstrate, such a model is in-
effective at best and harmful at worst. 
C. The Solution is Government-Industry Cooperation with a Focus 
on Transparency, Consistency, and Accountability 
The current method of industry self-regulation in the content modera-
tion arena is unlikely to last.  Users grow frustrated with vague and incon-
sistent community guidelines and Congress and the DOJ have started to 
slowly chip away at Section 230 protections for platforms.  But increasing 
                                                          
199. Emma Llansó, Amendments to EARN IT Act Can’t Fix the Bill’s Fundamental Flaws, 
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (July 1, 2020), https://cdt.org/insights/amendments-to-earn-it-act-
cant-fix-the-bills-fundamental-flaws/ [https://perma.cc/CC7L-CTNX].  
 200. Letter from Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey to Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 
193.  
201. See EARN IT Act of 2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020).  
202. Id.; Llansó, supra note 199.  
203. Sophia Cope, Aaron Mackey, & Andrew Crocker, The EARN IT Act Violates the Con-
stitution, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/03/earn-
it-act-violates-constitution [https://perma.cc/NHN9-6BNT]. 
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criminal liability for platforms is not the best method if we value free speech 
and open dialogue on platforms. 
The advent of social media platforms reimagined what social interac-
tion and connection could look like.  An effective content moderation model 
must also reimagine possible solutions.  This Note asserts that the best 
method of content moderation is a committee (“Committee”) that brings to-
gether regulators, platforms, content creators, users, and third-party technol-
ogy experts to propose a set of content moderation best practices that are 
voluntary to undertake that are voluntary to undertake.  This Committee 
should be different from the EARN IT Act’s Commission, which is mainly 
comprised of law enforcement and seeks to create guidelines for platforms 
to avoid criminal liability.204 
The role of the Committee proposed here is to create clear content mod-
eration standards, regularly update and publish the standards, and publicly 
rate platforms based on their adherence to the standards.205  The Committee 
should create a website where the best practices are published and where 
platforms and other websites that choose to adopt the best practices may be 
reported.  Although platforms may adopt the standards on a voluntary basis, 
adoption with minimal changes will create clear content moderation expec-
tations for users and creators. 
The guiding principles of the standards must address what current con-
tent moderation guidelines lack:  transparency, consistency, and accounta-
bility.  Transparency will address the uncertainty creators experience when 
they upload content.  Community guidelines today are too often described as 
a “black box,” where creators are uncertain as to whether their content will 
remain posted or whether it will get removed, demonetized, or restricted.206  
Although platforms may argue that releasing their proprietary algorithms and 
rules could expose their trade secrets, the issue could be remedied if “the 
                                                          
 204. S. 3398, 116th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (2020).  
205. Notably, Facebook has already created a similar committee, called the Oversight 
Board, to propose content moderation standards for Facebook.  The committee proposed by this 
article takes the concept a step further by creating consistent standards across platforms so that 
users can expect certain baseline content moderation rules across the many planforms that they use. 
Nick Clegg, Welcoming the Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (May 6, 2020) https://about.fb.com/news
/2020/05/welcoming-the-oversight-board/ [https://perma.cc/7CNP-HMF7]. 
 206. Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1377 
(2018).  
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public disclosures were general rather than granular in nature.”207  With 
standards clearly disclosed, creators could better understand what content is 
permissible.   
Consistency will address standards that change frequently and ab-
ruptly.  President Trump’s executive order and tweet to “REVOKE 230”208 
was likely due to Twitter’s inconsistent enforcement standards.  Twitter had 
never flagged a post of his as potentially misleading before, and, suddenly, 
it decided to start flagging when President Trump’s rhetoric contained mis-
information in a way it had never done before.209  Therefore, consistency 
may quell government attempts to regulate Section 230, because such at-
tempts generally focus on creating more predictability in the sort of content 
platforms do and do not allow.  Further, since each platform currently creates 
its own standards, what is acceptable on one platform may be unacceptable 
on another.  Though there is value in some variety from platform to platform, 
a consistent set of basic standards that serve as a floor would help create the 
predictability that is lacking across platforms.  To address issues with con-
sistency, the Committee must create and update standards on a regular sched-
ule instead of changing them suddenly. 
Finally, accountability will address the lack of consequences to plat-
forms for inconsistent and opaque community guidelines without threatening 
their Section 230 protections.  As previously described, the Committee must 
have a system in which it publicly ranks platforms and websites based on 
their adherence to the published best practices.  This method seeks to incen-
tivize platforms to comply by rewarding them with a high score for transpar-
ent and consistent content moderation standards without taking away their 
rights to moderate content as they please under Section 230.210  In addition, 
the ranking system will serve as an important resource for content creators 
when deciding on which platforms to publish content.  Platforms that have 
                                                          
207. Id. at 1384.  
208. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 29, 2020, 8:15 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1266387743996870656 [https://archive.is/iBmsK].  
209. Nicholas Reimann, Twitter Fact-Checks President Trump for the First Time, FORBES 
(May 26, 2020, 5:56 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicholasreimann/2020/05/26/twitter-fact-
checks-president-trump-for-the-first-time/#752786f82905 [https://perma.cc/42D8-LGR8]. 
 210. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (providing that platforms shall not be treated as publishers of 
user-generated content); 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (protecting platforms from civil liability for steps 
taken to moderate most content).  
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more transparent and consistent rules are more appealing to creators that de-
rive income from platforms and have the power to push users from one plat-
form to another.211   
This proposed committee would not be the first government-industry 
joint imitative in the technology space.  A similar framework was used to 
create the cybersecurity framework of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (“NIST”).212  “The [NIST] [f]ramework is voluntary guidance, 
based on existing standards, guidelines, and practices for organizations to 
better manage and reduce cybersecurity risk.”213  The framework was first 
developed in 2014 and was involved collaboration from “industry, academia, 
and government stakeholders” and used “workshops, extensive outreach and 
consultation, and a public comment process” to create the final product.214  
In 2015, 30% of United States companies used the NIST framework, a num-
ber projected to increase to 50% by 2020.215  The NIST framework provides 
all stakeholders involved with clear guidance on cybersecurity issues and 
gives both regulators and industry a hand in framing best practices. 
Today, regulators, platforms, users, and creators all want more control 
over what content moderation looks like.  What if, instead, content modera-
tion involved input from all of these groups?  The Committee proposed in 
this Note provides regulators with a set of clear best practices they can en-
courage, provides platforms with a seat at the table to decide how to moder-
ate their own content, and provides users and creators with predictable and 
solid rules to rely on when deciding how and where to publish content. 
                                                          
211. Alexander, supra note 149.  




214. Id.  
215. Cybersecurity Framework, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., https://
www.nist.gov/industry-impacts/cybersecurity-framework [https://perma.cc/VG5J-CA3E].  
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V. CONCLUSION 
In the backdrop of a global pandemic216 and mass civil unrest,217 Pres-
ident Trump propelled the issue of content moderation into public discourse 
in 2020.218  The current content moderation method of complete platform 
self-regulation, however, has created unrest and dissatisfaction for regula-
tors, platforms, content creators, and users alike.219   
Popular methods proposed instead of self-regulation are expanding the 
First Amendment’s free speech protections and full control by the govern-
ment.  However, both methods have inherent failings.  First Amendment free 
speech protections consistently fail in courts because platforms are private 
entities with the power to regulate their own content.220  Government-run 
solutions, on the other hand, have constitutional concerns and are often ill-
informed and oppressive.221  However, a third method is available—govern-
ment-industry cooperation.  Because social media is now a part of the daily 
lives of most Americans, the public has a stake in what content moderation 
looks like.  A system of joint governance gives all interested parties a seat at 
the table and ensures that the needs of all parties are taken into account. 
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